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llaborative Efforts in Cognitive
erapy with Religious Clients
R. MCMINN and CATHIE J. LEBOLD

therapy requires an under·
of and tolerance for the reli·
views of clients. Collaborative
llniiOL!es in cognitive therapy are de·
ond ideological obstacles in
cognitive therapy with religious
are considered. It is suggested
confronting clients' religious beliefs
curiOIOC!IICC:n or absolutistic is dini·
inappropriate. Beck's and
collaborative techniques
sed as important clinical
in working with religious

utcome studies of the usefulness of
cognitive therapy have proliferated in
recent years, reflecting the popularity
the cognitive approaches. Numerous
have demonstrated the effectiveness
therapy with unipolar depres(Beck, Hollon,
Bedrosian, &
1985; Blackburn, Bishop, Glenn,
, & Christie, 1981; Dobson & Shaw,
McNamara & Horan, 1986; Murphy,
Wetzel, & Lustman, 1984; Reynolds
, 1986; Rush, Beck, Kovacs, &
Shaw,
Simons, Lustman,
& Murphy, 1985; Simons, Murphy,
& Wetzel, 1986; Taylor & Marshall,
Teasdale, Fennell, Hibbert, & Amies,
Other effective uses of cognitive
have also been documented, in-

for reprints should be sent to Mark R.
PhD, Department of Psychology, George Fox
Newberg, Oregon 97132.

eluding cognitive-behavioral therapy for
hypochondriasis (Salkovskis & Warwick,
1986), postdivorce adjustment (Graff, Whitehead, & LeCompte, 1986), childhood disorders (Meador & Ollendick, 1984; Swanson,
1985), test anxiety (Dendata & Diener, 1986),
and reduction of Type A tendencies
man, 1985a, 1985b).
The effectiveness of cognitive therapy for
a variety of problems has been established.
Attention can now be turned to the questions of specific effectiveness addressed by
outcome researchers of other forms of psychotherapy
Strupp, 1978). Which cognitive therapists work best with which clients
which techniques? After reviewing the
literature on cognitive-behavioral treatment
of depression, Williams (1984) concluded
that an area requiring further investigation is
"specifying which technique works for which
patient and at what stage in the time-course
of the disorder" (p. 259). Although Williams
was not referring to religious variables, it
seems clear that an open consideration of
client and therapist religious values is essential when considering client-therapist matching (Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; McMinn, 1984).
Because psychologists tend to be nonreligious and sometimes lack sophistication
in understanding religious thought, Bergin
(1980) suggested that religious values of
clients need more consideration in the practice and evaluation of psychotherapy. A similar argument has recently emerged in the
psychiatric literature (Larson, Pattison, Blazer,
Omran, & Kaplan, 1986). A compelling reason to better understand religious values is
that nonreligious therapists tend to view religious clients as more responsible for their
problems than nonreligious clients (Houts &

Graham, 1986). Peteet (1981), Sacks (1985),
and Stovich 0985) correctly concluded that
sensitivity to and awareness of clients' religious traditions is an important element of
effective treatment.
Moreover, clients with religious values expect their values to be respected in therapy.
A recent survey showed that 79% of respondents believed religious values were important to discuss in therapy. Over half of the
respondents preferred to seek therapy at a
pastoral counseling center (Quackenbos,
Privette, & Klentz, 1985).

Collaborative Empiricism in
Cognitive Therapy
Although the cognitive therapies have certain commonalities, they also have distinctions. For example, Albert Ellis (1962) attempts to identify and dispute irrational
beliefs quite immediately in the process of
rational-emotive therapy (RET). In contrast,
Aaron Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy for
depression is first oriented toward discovering internal communications and automatic
thoughts. In order to evaluate these internal
communications and automatic thoughts,
Beck suggested the therapist and client collaborate by deriving appropriate "experiments." Those automatic thoughts eventually
do lead the therapist to the maladaptive underlying assumptions which are similar to
Ellis's irrational beliefs. Donald Meichenbaum's 0977) cognitive-behavior therapy
differs from both Beck and Ellis in that
Meichenbaum does not search for a single
scheme or irrational belief. Rather, he collaborates with clients in creating a fiction to explain behavior. That fiction then becomes a
guide to more effective behavior and control
of emotions (Meichenbaum, 1987).
Both Beck and Meichenbaum emphasized
the need for therapist and client to collaborate whereas RET tends to be more teaching
oriented and may involve more direct confrontation. As a hypothetical example, consider a 25-year-old depressed woman who
feels she is failing in her career because she
was recently passed over for promotion. A
rational-emotive therapist would teach her
that her emotions are not as much related to

loss of promotion as to her beliefs.
ample, she may believe that if she is
very best employee then she is a
ure. By teaching her to dispute the
belief, a rational-emotive therapist
help her realize that the loss of one
tion does not mean she is failing.
A therapist employing Beck's
therapy might collaborate with this
constructing an experiment. Since
lieves she is failing in her work, she
be instructed to interview ten
and two supervisors about their
her work performance. This
might help modify her automatic
that she is a failure.
A therapist employing Meic
cognitive-behavior therapy might use
oration to develop a "healthy
script." For example, using what
baum (1987) called a "Columbo
a therapist might verbally note the
that this client is telling herself
make her feel bad and yet seems to
improve, as evidenced by her
participate in therapy. The woman
then decide to explore alternate ways
ing to herself in order to change her
Although all cognitive therapies
rational, logical intervention,
the 1984 World Congress on
Therapy noted that, despite the
of cognitive therapies, emotions can
distorted thinking and emotions and
tions can occur simultaneously
1984). Thus, it is important to find
broaden cognitive therapies beyond
sumptions on which they were
Beck (Beck & Padesky, 1987) and
baum (1987) appear to be using
tion to better include affective
their therapies. Rather than being
linear perspective (such as Ellis's
model) where irrational beliefs cause
tive emotions, Beck's and
emphasis on collaboration allows for
teractional view of emotions and
With such an interactional view,
serve an important role in identifying
cognitions. Cognitions evoked by
emotional states can then be

using collaborative methods.

Cognitive Therapy with Religious
Clients
Understanding clients' religious values
be especially important in cognitive
where beliefs and schemas are rouevaluated and systematically changed.
(1987) concluded that "there has
been a danger that the rational or
therapies have underplayed the
played by values in the urge to stress
importance of rationality and logic" (p.
The role of religious values in cognitherapy has received little research at' tention, perhaps because of the relative
.·.newness of the cognitive therapies. A few
empirical studies and theoretical works have
been published.
Bruun (1985) reported a case study where
cognitive therapy was combined with reli. gious strategies for effective outcome. It illus.ttated the positive potential of matching a religious client with a religious therapist but
doesn't address broader issues of client-therapist matching.
Pecheur and Edwards (1984) compared
secular and religious versions of cognitive
·.therapy for depression. They found both verof cognitive therapy to be more effecthan a waiting list control condition. No
···n1mnnrr1P difference between secular and reliversions was found. However, the
is limited by two problems. First, Christherapists were used for both groups.
only difference in therapy was the exuse of their belief system in cognitive
Second, subjects were Chrisin both treatment conditions. Although
study yields interesting results, it does
address questions of client-therapist
Propst Cl980a) reported use of religious
imagety to be superior to nonreliimagery in treating mild depression.
in her study were nonreligious
understanding of religious value systems.
~~\j;.lle11ts in the religious imagety group were
matched with clients in the stanimagery group. Propst's study suggests
tat least some forms of cognitive therapy

can be modified to be more effective with
religious clients, even when the therapy is
delivered by nonreligious therapists who are
understanding of their clients' values.
In addition to the empirical studies reported above, two authors have compared spiritual and cognitive treatment approaches theoretically. Propst Cl980b) suggested a parallel
between cognitive restructuring and evangelical approaches, especially with regard to the
uses of imagery. Tan (1987) used principles
from Scripture to construct a biblical approach to therapy that is largely cognitivebehavioral in orientation and practice, but
more broad-based and comprehensive than
secular cognitive-behavior therapy. He also
pointed out many limitations and criticisms
of cognitive therapies. These works may be
useful for religious therapists interested in
using cognitive-behavior interventions incorporating spiritual dimensions with religious
clients.
Matching techniques to specific clients
may require more than additional research.
Existing research methodologies result in
global assessments rather than yielding specific technique variations that might be attempted in response to ideological differences of religious clients. For example, we
know that religious imagery is more effective
than nonreligious imagery in dealing with religious clients (Propst, 1980a), but we do not
know which specific religious ideologies
make the imagery technique most advisable.
Some religious clients will reject any kind of
imagery technique because of recent Christian writings opposed to imagery of all kinds
(Hunt, 1987; Hunt & McMahon, 1985). Until
our research methodologies are sufficiently
refined to address more specific effectiveness
questions, these questions must be addressed by reporting experience-based observations. Below, we outline specific areas
of ideological conflict observed in doing cognitive therapy with religious clients and suggest appropriate technique modification. In
each case, we conclude the collaborative elements of cognitive therapy (Beck, Rush,
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Meichenbaum, 1977)
to be preferable over more confrontive approaches, such as rational-emotive therapy.

Ideological Obstacles with
Religious Clients
Sell-Interest and Self-Direction
Ellis (1971) asserted that self-interest and
self-direction are qualities of emotionally
healthy individuals. Because religious clients
have neither, according to Ellis 0971), they
are not emotionally healthy. One goal of rational-emotive therapy is to help the client
become healthier by acting more upon personal interests (Ellis, 1980).
As Ellis (1971) suggested, some religious
clients are opposed to concepts of self-interest. Biblical passages such as the following
seem to counter goals of self-interest:
"Whoever finds his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake will find it"
(Matt. 10:39); "Whatever was to my profit I
nm.Z: consider loss for the sake of Christ"
(Phil. 3:7).
Many religious clients see self-sacrifice as
a higher calling than self-interest. Rather than
disputing this belief, it is most useful to focus
on locus of control and issues of choice.
Clients who choose to give up a right or privilege in order to help another will feel differently than those who believe they must give
up a right or privilege. The former will engage in reinforcing self-talk while the latter
will feel deprived.
Ellis 0971) is misguided in describing religious clients as less self-directed, accepting
less responsibility for themselves. While
some studies have shown no relation between locus of control and religiosity (Benson & Spilka, 1973; Berman & Hays, 1973;
Friedberg & Friedberg, 1985; Sexton, Leak, &
Toenies, 1980), some have shown religious
individuals to be more internal (Shrauger &
Silverman, 1971; Silvestri, 1979; Strickland &
Shaffer, 1971), indicating that religious individuals expect to have at least as much control over themselves as nonreligious individuals. Thus, it is unreasonable to conclude, as
Ellis does, that religious individuals accept
less responsibility.
Overtly trying to change a religious client
to be more self-interested and self-directed
will probably result in resistance. Christian
clients often come to therapy with concerns

that their values will be attacked or
lenged (Worthington, 1986). Rather tha
fronting or challenging their values,
clients' belief systems and trying to
them focus on locus of control will be
useful. Clients will be more likely to
unreasonable expectations of Lvu"''dl.LL
sacrifice if therapists focus on
choice rather than directly confronting
Beck's (Beck et al., 1979) use of
rative empiricism is useful here.
believe they need to always be
test their assumptions by
For example, they might watch closely
tor or religious leader to see if he or
always selfless. Their beliefs will
become more reasonable as they
indicating that complete selflessness
hopeless ideal and as those data are
ered in a supportive therapeutic Pnmr,nru
When doing collaborative
religious clients, it is often important
data collection occur within the
the client's religious environment.
0985) indicated that the authority for
ing cognitions may reside in oneself,
consensus, or expert authority. Since
liefs of religious clients often come
pert authority (pastor, Bible, God, etc.
important to involve that authority in
orative empirical efforts. Having
clients verify thoughts by observing
haviors of Christian leaders or finding
priate Scripture passages is often
cause these sources are held in a

Rigid Thinking
Both rational-emotive therapy (Ellis,
and cognitive therapy for depression
1976) postulate that self-statements
dichotomous thinking or arbitrary "
are emotionally disruptive. Changing
statements" involves teaching clients
come more scientific in their thinking.
often involves confrontation in
tive therapy and collaborative
cognitive therapy for depression.
gious clients, should statements are
ficult to modify because of the
which they are based, especially since
of depressed individuals are likely

on illogical justification (Cook &
1986). Illogic and high authority for
"'':'L"-"'~w is a difficult combination to counter.
Confronting should statements in a threatway may present problems for the
therapist working with religious
This is especially true early in thersince initial responses to cognitive therapy seem to play an important role in out,
Fennell & Teasdale (1987) found that
,,,nvc•~ slow responders to cognitive therapy
began with skepticism about the role of
in overcoming depression had
''"'"'""rPr long-term treatment outcome. Conskeptical clients might easily be peras criticism, preventing the necessary
'""''-u·~~ alliance. This is especially likely
since religious clients often bring irrational
beliefs about psychology into therapy
(Rayburn, 1985). These beliefs require accepting attitudes on the part of therapists.
Some "shoulds" of religious clients represent unrealistic demands for perfection. For
, ~xample, "I should always be nice to everyone I meet" or "I should never be angry" are
unrealistic self-demands. Perfection demands,
· in turn, are likely to precipitate depression
(Hewitt & Dyck, 1986), anxiety and anger
'{Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984). Rossi
(1985) suggested that successful therapy for
religious clients often involves an examina, :don of their perfectionistic tendencies.
Collaborative empiricism can also be used
with should statements and the tendency toreligious perfectionism. For example, a
client might agree to find biblical
that he or she should never be
. The client might also look for biblical
that anger is acceptable under
circumstances. Alternatively, the client
interview religious leaders to get their
and experiences.
Another strategy, consistent with Meichencognitive-behavioral therapy, is to rea client's religious script. For example,
of us worked with a client whose deseemed directly connected to her
s~/~"i'1Jers that she was an inadequate Christian.
productive session was spend collaboely reviewing the internal script she used
n sitting in church. Her pastor, who ap-

parently was quite negative and critical in
most sermons, evoked many negative selfstatements in her. She told herself, "Other
Christians are more committed than I am," "If
I was really a Christian I would do more
things for the church," and so on. Several
subsequent sessions were spent looking at
emotional consequences of the thoughts and
eventually she decided she wanted to learn
another script. In her new script, she internally challenged the words of her pastor
rather than automatically feeling guilty for
her inadequacy. She learned the script
quickly, generalized it to other self-statements, and showed significant gains in therapy. The key was collaborating in evaluating
the self-talk rather than immediately confronting it as irrational.

Need for Philosophical Change
Ellis 0987) recently argued that most cognitive therapies miss the important element
of identifying and altering the absolutistic demands clients place on themselves. He then
concluded that rational-emotive therapy is
more satisfactory than other cognitive therapies because it allows clients to have deeper
philosophical changes in their thinking.
Earlier, Ellis (1971) argued that religious individuals are not emotionally healthy individuals. He himself is a probabilistic atheist and
he believes these religious values to be the
most satisfactory for good emotional health
(Ellis, 1980).
Ellis' suggestion is antithetical to the point
of this article. In fact, this is precisely the
point of contention we have with Ellis .
Whereas he argues that devout religious values need to be changed in order for mental
health to be attained, we believe the philosophical beliefs of religious clients can often
be maintained throughout effective cognitive
therapy by using appropriate collaboration.
For example, Ellis (1980) argued that blaming oneself is irrational and can only come
from unhealthy absolute standards of right
and wrong. But many religious clients have
absolute standards of right and wrong, based
on written authority or religious leaders, and
blame themselves for violating those standards. To argue that one cannot be emotion-

ally healthy within the context of absolute
standards of right and wrong is to overlook
the millions of emotionally healthy religious
individuals who never seek psychological
help. There have been differing opinions
about whether religious thinking contributes
to psychopathology (Bergin, 1980; Ellis,
1971; London, 1976; McLemore & Court,
1977; Walls, 1980), but the most definitive
empirical study is Bergin's (1983) critical
evaluation and meta-analysis demonstrating
that religious individuals have no more psychopathology than do nonreligious individuals. Moreover, Donahue's (1985) review indicates that intrinsic religiousness is unrelated
to negative personality characteristics.
The goal of cognitive therapy is to implement some philosophical changes in the way
clients view their world. However, Ellis' assumptions that devout religious philosophies
need to be altered (Ellis, 1984) is not consistent with pastoral or Christian therapy
(Wessler, 1984).
Helping clients determine which philosophical changes to pursue needs to be a
collaborative effort. One can test whether or
not an absolutistic belief system requires
change. If a belief system necessitates depression, then everyone with that belief system will be depressed. Otherwise, individual
cognitive differences or some noncognitive
factors account for the client's depression.
Beck's cognitive therapy and Meichenbaum's cognitive-behavioral therapy do not
ignore philosophical realities. But rather than
searching for a global form of absolutistic
thinking, Beck and Meichenbaum advocate
searching for individualized scripts or schema,
beliefs about the world based upon past
learning. Although these schema may sometimes relate to religious views, effective treatment doesn't necessarily require the client to
abandon absolutistic thinking altogether.
Conclusion
The empirical data on cognitive therapy
with religious clients are sparse. It appears
that religious imagery is useful for some religious clients and that cognitive therapy remains effective when modified into a religious form. However, two best-selling

Christian books (Hunt, 1987;
McMahon, 1985) have recently
chologists' use of imagery, so
ward imagery, even religious ·
be a factor in working with some
Regardless of lacking empirical
subtle dimensions of doing cognitive
with religious clients cannot be
plored with current research
Thus, we have observed, based on
experience, some ideological
doing cognitive therapy with religious
With each obstacle we have pointed
importance of using collaborative
therapy. By using Beck's technique of
orative empiricism or Meichenbaum's
orative therapeutic style, clients can be
vated to evaluate their beliefs in a
way. Excessive confrontation, especially
a nonreligious therapist, may produce
tance rather than progress. We tend to
with Marzillier (1987):
A frontal attack on highly cherished beliefs will,
lieve, tend to lead to greater resistance to change
response to the overwhelming barrage from
therapist, a token surrender that does not lead to
or substantive belief change. (p. 150)

Cognitive therapy is an effective
for depression, anxiety, and other
ders-that has been determined. We
need to turn our attention to more
questions of applying cognitive
to our clients, many of whom have
orientations. Beck's and Meichenbaum'
phasis on collaboration in therapy
be more promising than the directive
confrontive approaches of
therapy.
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